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May 2007
Attorney Fees and Lien Priorities
Roger Bernhardt

[I have really written two Midcourse Corrections columns for this issue, but have hidden them
under one heading so that the CEB publishers would not realize I was breaking their rules. This
first one is on offsets, attorney fees, and lien priorities; below it is a second column on the
Statute of Frauds.—RB]
Behniwal v Mix
Until I read the decision in Behniwal v Mix (2006) 147 CA4th 621, 54 CR3d 427, reported on
p 84, I had always innocently believed that a purchaser who was successful in a specific
performance action, and who had an attorney fees clause in his contract, could deduct what he
was awarded by the court for those fees from the amount that he would have to pay. Now I have
learned that the rule is otherwise, but I have to say that I regret that and I would like to find some
way to get around it.
The Behniwals finally prevailed in their action to compel the Mixes to honor their contract to
sell their condominium unit to them for $540,000 and, in addition, were awarded over $250,000
in attorney fees. (The matter had gone to the court of appeal on at least three prior occasions, and
I have commented on two of its previous opinions—see 29 CEB RPLR 222 (Jan. 2006) and 28
CEB RPLR 83 (May 2005).) The trial court ordered the attorney fees to be deducted from the
purchase price, but that order was reversed on this appeal. According to Justice Sills, who had
authored all of the opinions in this interesting saga, the attorney fees award ranks below two
deeds of trust on the seller’s property as well as the seller’s homestead declaration. Since those
three other claims by themselves exceed the purchase price, if attorney fees were taken off the
top, it would play “absolute havoc with the law of liens and lien priorities.” 146 CA4th at 632.
Justice Sills reached this conclusion by some very elegant reasoning. He first determined that
an attorney fees award in a specific performance action by itself does not reduce the price in the
same way that an equitable adjustment might. (The older cases that seemed to say that were
doing so only as a kind of “rough justice” in contexts where priority did not matter.) The fee
award is not mere incidental relief to a specific performance decree, but rather an additional
right—created by the attorney fees clause in the contract—with no special claim to any lien
superpriority. Attorney fees are just a money judgment that will function like a lien (with
concomitant lien priority) only after it has been recorded.
Offsets and Priorities
It is hard to disagree with any of that reasoning, but the legislature may have superseded it by
its treatment of offsets. The statement in CCP §431.70 that cross demands “are compensated so
far as they equal each other” does not seem to make an offset depend on any particular priority
status. If the Behniwals’ attorney fees are treated as though they had already been paid to Mix
(see Murphy v FDIC (9th Cir 1994) 38 F3d 1490), any lien inferiority on their part would not

matter because the cross demands were “deemed compensated.” See Murchison v Murchison
(1963) 219 CA2d 600, 33 CR 285.
In fact, the judicial principle that offset is more appropriate when the cross party may be
insolvent (and thus less likely to be able to honor its half of the burden; see Erlich v Superior
Court (1965) 63 C2d 551, 47 CR 473) seems also to run contrary to the notion that offsets are
controlled by lien priority principles. In those cases, giving a litigant an offset right certainly
worsens the position of its adversary’s other creditors.
Nor would offset necessarily wreck our system of priorities, as Justice Sills seems to fear. No
preexisting deed of trust on the seller’s property would be pushed down by a buyer’s offset
because a third party lender, not being a party to the specific performance litigation, would find
its instrument unaffected by it—only the identity of the trustor would change. The successful
purchaser would take title to the property, subject to whatever balance there was on existing
deeds of trust, and no attorney fees award would trump those liens. If the balance of cash the
purchaser then pays isn’t enough to retire the preexisting liens entirely, they just stay on the title.
Sooner or later, the purchaser will have to pay them off.
Priority Against Later Claims
In Behniwal, the lien priority that had to be dealt with concerned three interests that were
created after the purchasers had filed their lawsuit and recorded their lis pendens. Even if the
right of offset was subject to the rules of priority, why did the attorney fees award have to go
behind those three later claims?
Justice Sills’s answer was that, as a technical matter, the attorney fees could achieve lien status
only after a money judgment had been rendered and recorded, all of which happened after the
other three interests went of record. But that only triggered the question: Why shouldn’t the
purchasers’ award relate back to the date they recorded their lis pendens, which was before those
three interests appeared?
Relation back is what I would have expected, but in Justice Sills’s view, the lis pendens only
notifies third parties that the buyer is suing to enforce a sale of the land at the stated contract
price (unreduced by offsets) (147 CA4th at 638):
A buyer or moneylender, then, could have reasonably relied on the buyers’ own pleadings to
conclude that, should the buyers be successful, the court would force the sellers to convey the
property for the contract price of $540,000.... [A] lender could also reasonably rely on the
pleadings to conclude that the property could be safely encumbered up to that $540,000 amount.
That the pleadings also gave notice of a potential attorney fee award did not matter because
that award would be only a later money judgment that could not relate back to the earlier lis
pendens. Justice Sills treats the lis pendens differently than a recorded deed of trust, which puts
all subsequent parties on notice that attorney fees in any foreclosure will also come off the top
and before them.
That proposition is true only after this decision has made it a correct statement, but before the
decision was announced, I believed that the general principle was that a lis pendens
•

Puts purchasers and encumbrancers on notice that they will take subject to any judgment
thereafter entered in the case;

•

Will bind them to any judgment that might be entered (see BGJ Assocs., LLC v Superior Court
(1999) 75 CA4th 952, 89 CR2d 693; Ahmanson Bank & Trust Co. v Tepper (1969) 269 CA2d
333, 74 CR 774); and

•

Would apprise them of the possibility that an award of attorney fees could be offset against the
purchase price.
Despite this opinion, I think attorneys should still caution subsequent takers as to this risk.
There remains a real danger that they could be charged with inquiry notice of all plaintiff’s
claims, including attorney fees.
Priority Against the Other Claim
I think doubts about priority would be even stronger for the law firm that took the second deed
of trust. How can those lawyers claim to be BFPs without notice, entitled to protection of the
recording acts against a plaintiff’s attorney fees claim, when they are engaged in representing
their client against that claim—and, therefore, surely have actual knowledge of it? We are not
told the circumstances of that transaction in Behniwal, but if a law firm’s deed of trust was given
to secure payment for services to be rendered, would not those fees have the status of future
advances made with actual knowledge of the junior claim? (I second the observation made by
Justice Sills that the losing side’s attorney is the only real winner in the case.)
Finally, I would have doubts about assuring the defendant sellers that any homestead they
filed after they had been sued would protect them against their buyers. Generally, a later filed
homestead can prevail against an earlier filed action, but in this case that earlier action sought
attorney fees that the sellers had agreed to in their sales contract (executed before anything else
had happened). I would worry that the attorney fees clause in the sales contract could justify
treating the fee award as a kind of preexisting consensual claim against which the homestead
might not prevail. (Miller & Starr say that the homestead exemption does not apply against an
equitable mortgage, whether it is recorded or not. 5 California Real Estate §13:43 (3d ed 2000).)
But all of my speculations turn out to be faulty in light of the decision in Behniwal, which
significantly raises the stakes for purchasers contemplating specific performance litigation. Not
only must they be prepared to prove that their contract is just and reasonable (as well as merely
enforceable) and be prepared to stay ready, willing, and able throughout the entire litigation to
pay the purchase price whenever the vendors are ordered or offer to perform, but now they also
must be prepared to have their expected award of attorney fees held subordinate to any liens the
sellers (involuntarily or voluntarily) impose on the property during the litigation, devastating
their ability to offset those fees against the price they will still have to pay.
Justice Sills is too respected, and has thought too hard about this case, to make it likely that
any other appellate tribunal will disagree with him. The legislature is certainly not going to
bother itself with the small (and difficult) problem this case presents. So I predict that this is
going to stay as our rule.
Can Anything Be Done About It?
Is there a way for purchasers to reduce the risks this rule creates? I cannot offer much help if
the deal has already fallen apart and they are about to sue. They will not receive a fee award until
the end, and then it will rank only as a money judgment with no superpriority despite any lis
pendens they have earlier filed. Maybe they could file an attachment enabling the judgment to

relate back to the lis pendens filing, but can purchasers both attach and lis pendens the very
property they are attempting to purchase? Even if they can, our supreme court has held that a
later homestead prevails over a prior attachment anyway. Becker v Lindsay (1976) 16 C3d 188,
127 CR 348.
Better language in the agreement, inserted at the drafting stage, is the only hope. Thus, some
provision in the contract should give lien status to any attorney fees later awarded and also
provide for relation back to the date of contract execution. It would be hard, if not impossible, to
negotiate any individualized version of that kind of arrangement, but published forms could do
that for everybody.
Since attorney fees clauses occur in most contracts, and are therefore presumably desirable to
both sides, a supplemental provision in the same paragraph that gives those fees some teeth
might generate little controversy at the early contract formation stage. If the same provision also
allowed the prevailing sellers to use their fee awards to include the purchasers’ deposits (even
when there is no, or only a lesser, liquidated damages clause), both sides might be better off.

